The Second Storm

When we think of Hurricane Katrina the storm, we see that nutcase reporter on television getting side-swiped by 100+ mph winds. We see the choppy waters of the Gulf of Mexico. We see rain pelting buildings, but the wind-blown water comes from the side, not from above. In short, we think about the events of August 29, 2005. We think about that massive white cloud that looks like it jumps toward the Gulf Coast after passing over Florida.

But there was another storm that came after Hurricane Katrina. This storm was not weather-related. However, just like the rain, wind, water, and sand combined in the aforementioned weather system, this storm also had varying components converge to destroy lives and valuable possessions.

The first ingredient is the lack of any federally-sponsored or organized comprehensive plan for rebuilding. Homeowners are asked to go it alone, or seduce Lady Luck by petitioning for their own existence by applying for assistance from private relief organizations. Even then, these private relief organizations, one of which is the Presbyterian Disaster Assistance group (who we will be working with in April), are limited in their ability to assist. For example, the PDA cannot completely rebuild a house; it can only renovate it and improve the structure. Those of us who made the trip to Gulfport last year and saw the concrete slabs and isolated chimneys know that many structures are simply not there. While FEMA did eventually respond, its process for distributing loans is long and extremely bureaucratic; there are Mississippi residents who still do not have FEMA money today. The other problem with rebuilding is that elected officials are hurting the process. Congress issued $5.4 billion in Community Block Development Grants, with the intent of helping those needing aid from Katrina. Originally these grants were distributed with the requirement that half of the funding be issued to low- to moderate-income residents. Haley Barbour, the governor of Mississippi, stepped in and ultimately was able to waive this stipulation; currently, only 20% of the funding has been allocated for the low- to moderate-income resident, with much of the funding not yet distributed.

Another piece to this second storm can be found in the lack of insurance afforded to an extraordinary number of Gulf Coast residents. Many insurance companies deny claims from Katrina due to water damage not being covered under their policies, even though there are many homes that would have surely sustained wind damage, which is covered under most insurance policies. State Farm, the largest insurance company in Mississippi, denies claims that involve sustained water and wind damage. The company issued a statement in February of 2007 announcing that the company is writing no new policies in the region, as the “current legal and political environment is simply untenable. We’re just in a position to accept any additional risk in this homeowners’ market.” For operating in an “untenable” environment, State Farm did quite well: in 2006, State Farm made $5.3 billion – the same as their earnings in 2004.

The haphazard rebuilding process has also led to a third component of the storm – a purgatory of sorts for wandering residents. With no federal assistance (other than the mirage of FEMA loans), Mississippians are forced to spend their savings in attempting to re-create their pre-Katrina lives. Many of these efforts, though, are stopped short as funding is exhausted. One family in the Mississippi area invested $25,000 into repairs from Katrina, but ran out of money with only 60% of the house completed. Relief organizations can then step in and assist families in these situations, but many organizations, like PDA, use unskilled volunteers and can also be short on funding. Those that were renters prior to August of 2005 have no place to go: instead of their former properties being rebuilt, new, pricey condominiums have been erected. 13,000 families still live in FEMA trailers, and most are displaced, former renters. Highway 90, running east and west along the Gulf through Gulfport, has seen much of this new construction.

While there are many other parts to this storm that is still hammering the Gulf Coast region, these three may be the most significant. Working together, they ensure that the ordinary Mississippi homeowner has as difficult a time as possible trying to regain his or her footing. Limited (at best) federal response, lackluster insurance companies, and displaced residents mark the second storm; and just like Katrina, warnings appear to be going unheard.